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Proposals for marginal cost water pricing have often been found to be politically infeasible 
because current users will have to pay a higher price even though future users will be better off. 
We show how efficiency pricing can be rendered Pareto-improving, and thus politically feasible, 
by compensating the users suffering a loss due to higher prices. We also provide a method for 
determining efficient spatial and inter-temporal water management for a system with 
consumption at significantly different elevations supplied from a renewable coastal aquifer, 
which is subject to salinity if over-extracted.  
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Introduction 
Proposals for marginal cost water pricing have often been found to be politically infeasible 
(Johansson, Postel, also see Dinar and Wolf), especially where the marginal cost of groundwater 
is taken to include the marginal user cost of depleting the aquifer. As a result, inefficient pricing 
is continued and groundwater is overused by the present generation of consumers, causing early 
depletion of aquifers and need to use desalination or other high-cost alternative sources of water 
supply. The present generation is, thus, able to extract large transfers from the future generations 
by imposing the burden of premature depletion. Despite the fact that the switch to efficiency 
(marginal cost) pricing is potentially Pareto improving, it cannot be implemented; future 
consumers have no political weight, other than what may be conferred on them by current 
altruistic consumers. 
This is no surprise. When gains from efficiency pricing are far in the future and are realized after 
initial losses from paying (higher) efficiency prices, then rational present users would accept the 
switch to efficiency pricing if: 1) present value of future gains is more than the present value of 
initial losses, 2) present users have enough foresight and confidence (to expect the future gains), 
and 3) present users are either a) sufficiently long-lived (to enjoy the future gains themselves), or 
b) sufficiently interested in the benefit of future generations
1 (to value the total benefit to future 
generations equal to or more than their own total losses). Conditions (2) and (3) are stringent, 
and without them the present users may not have an incentive to adopt efficient pricing and 
usage policies. By compensating losers in every period, these problems can be avoided.  
                                                            
1 For example, if the welfare-losing present generation users were going to leave positive bequests to the welfare-
gaining future generations, those bequests could be reduced to make up for the present generation’s loss and to 
offset the gain to the future generations.   3 
Our objectives in this article are to use the urban Honolulu water district as a case in point to: 1) 
to compute the efficient allocation of water across time and across locations, 2) to compute 
efficiency prices needed at the margin to support the efficient allocation as a decentralized 
equilibrium, 3) to simulate the effects of the status quo policy of pricing water at average cost of 
extraction and distribution, 4) to estimate the topographic and temporal distribution of welfare 
gain/loss to users by switching from the status quo to efficiency pricing, and 5) to define a lump 
sum compensation scheme such that the switch to efficiency pricing causes no user to be a net 
loser. 
The derivation of efficiency pricing in many places is complicated by the fact that distribution 
costs vary substantially across users. In Honolulu, this happens because water is used at 
significantly different elevations (from sea level to over 1300 feet). The current (status quo) 
pricing system does not differentiate prices across locations and results in cross subsidies from 
low to high elevation users (table 1). The marginal cost differentials need to be reflected in 
efficiency prices (Spulber and Sabbaghi). We estimate distribution costs for users at all 
elevations (using data from the water utility, Honolulu Board of Water Supply) and group users 
into elevation categories based on similar distribution costs. Efficiency price paths are computed 
for each category. 
The groundwater aquifers that provide freshwater in coastal areas, such as Honolulu, usually 
have an underground layer of freshwater floating on salty seawater (Mink). If the freshwater is 
extracted faster than recharge (or inflow from the watershed), the freshwater head falls, the 
saltwater rises, and the freshwater layer becomes thinner. Since most pumping wells go deeper 
than the freshwater head, the rising saltwater can ultimately reach the bottom of the current well 
systems that will then begin to pump out saltwater. The Honolulu Board of Water Supply takes   4 
the saltwater interface into account in its extraction planning, but the effect of saltwater rise has 
not been incorporated in previous models of efficient pricing on Oahu. Accordingly, we 
constrain the freshwater head from falling below the level at which the wells would begin to turn 
saline. If demand growth requires more freshwater than that allowable under the constraint, it 
must be obtained through a backstop source: desalination of seawater. 
Comparing the welfare effects of switching from existing under-pricing (status quo) to efficiency 
pricing, we estimate that efficiency pricing results in high-elevation consumers being slightly 
worse off for the first 57 years, amounting to a total present-value loss of about $34 million. 
Current low-elevation consumers benefit from paying reduced distribution costs and all future 
consumers benefit from deferring of desalination costs, by a total of more than $440 million in 
present value terms. This potential Pareto improvement can be converted into an actual Pareto 
improvement by compensating the losing consumers through block pricing, with initial blocks 
given free of charge and the cost of the free block charged to the welfare-gaining consumers who 
are better off even after providing the compensation.  
Conceptual Framework 
The Model 
Krulce, Roumasset, and Wilson (KRW) derive intertemporally optimal, but spatially uniform, 
pricing of water extracted from an aquifer with coastal characteristics (dynamic, interdependent 
groundwater stock and recharge). Spatial optimization of water use has been modeled by several 
authors, but has not yet been made directly applicable to the case of a coastal aquifer. For 
example, Chakravorty, Hochman, and Zilberman (CHZ) develop an excellent static spatial 
optimization model for surface water. Chakravorty and Umetsu extend the CHZ model to include   5 
groundwater but the groundwater aquifer does not evolve over time and, therefore, abstracts 
away from coastal characteristics. We, therefore, modify and extend the KRW model in a simple 
way to include spatial optimization for an urban water system where water usage is distributed 
over different elevations categories. Consumption in category i at time t is qt
i and grows over 
time due to population and income growth. The demand function is Di(pt
i,t), where pt
i is the price 
at time t in the elevation category i, and the second argument, t, allows for any exogenous growth 
in demand (e.g., due to income or population growth).  
Water is extracted from a coastal groundwater aquifer that is recharge from a watershed and 
leaks into the ocean from its ocean boundary depending on the aquifer head level, h. As the head 
level rises, underground water pressure from watershed decreases and the rate of recharge 
decreases. Also, leakage surface area and ocean-ward water pressure increase and the rate of 
leakage increases. Thus, we model net recharge, l,  (recharge net of leakage) as a positive, 
decreasing, concave function of head, i.e.,  ( ) 0, ( ) 0, 0 l h l h l ¢ ¢¢ ³ < £ . The aquifer head level, h, 
changes over time depending on the net aquifer recharge, l, and the quantity extracted for 









h l h q g × = - ￿ ￿ where g is a factor of conversion from volume of water in gallons (on the 
R.H.S.) to head level in feet. In the remainder of this section, however, we subsume this factor, 




h l h q = -￿ ￿  as the relevant 
equation of head motion. If the aquifer is not utilized (i.e., quantity extracted is zero), the head 
level will rise to the highest level h , where leakage exactly equal balances inflow,  ( ) 0 l h =  As 
the head cannot rise above this level, we have  ( ) 0 l h >  whenever the aquifer is being exploited.     6 
The shape of the aquifer is a Ghyben-Herzberg lens, in which a freshwater layer floats on salty 
seawater that percolates from the ocean (see Mink). As the freshwater head level falls, depending 
on the extraction rate, the freshwater-saltwater interface rises. If the head level falls below hmin, 
the interface rises to the level of well bottoms.
2 The wells then pump out saltwater and no more 
freshwater can be extracted.
3 Therefore, we measure head as the level above hmin. Any expansion 
in demand when the head level has fallen to hmin would need to be supplied from the backstop 
source: desalination of seawater. 
The unit cost of extraction is a function of the vertical distance water has to be lifted, f = e – h, 
where e is the elevation of the well location. At lower head levels, it is more expensive to extract 
water because the water must be lifted over longer distance against gravity, and the effect of 
gravity becomes more pronounced as the lift, f, increases. The extraction cost is, therefore, a 
positive, increasing, convex function of the lift,  ( ) 0 c f ³ , where  ( ) 0, ( ) 0 c f c f ¢ ¢¢ > ³ . Since the 
well location is fixed, we can redefine the unit extraction cost as a function of the head level
4: 
( ) 0 q c h ³ , where 
0 ( ) 0,  ( ) 0, lim ( ) q q q h c h c h c h
®
¢ ¢¢ < ³ = ¥. The total cost of extracting water from the 
aquifer at the rate q given head level h is cq(h).q. The cost of transporting a unit of extracted 
water to users in category, i, is cd
i. The unit cost of the backstop (desalination) is represented by 
cb and the quantity of the backstop used is bt
i. 
A hypothetical social planner chooses the extraction and backstop quantities over time to 
maximize the present value (with r as the discount rate) of net social surplus. 
                                                            
22 We have assumed a sharp interface between freshwater and saltwater in the aquifer. In reality, the interface is 
made up of a brackish water zone that becomes more and more salty as the head level falls. This brackish water can 
also be converted into drinkable water by appropriate processes (e.g., reverse osmosis). To allow for such 
desalination, it would be necessary to make desalination cost an increasing function of salinity level (see Duarte). 
3 The process is generally considered irreversible, especially since the percolation of freshwater from watershed is 
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The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are: 
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For efficiency pricing, we need to solve the system of equations (1) – (4). We define the optimal 
price path as 
1( , )
i i i
t i t t p D q b t
- º + in each category. Assuming that the cost of desalination is high 
enough so that water is always extracted from the aquifer, condition (3) holds with equality and 
yields the in situ shadow price of water, as the royalty (i.e., price less unit extraction and 
distribution cost). 
(5)  ( )
i i
t t q t d p c h c l = - -  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 It may also be a function of the water volume extracted, but we follow KRW is assuming constant returns to scale.   8 
Time derivative of (5) is  ( )
i
t t q t t p c h h l ¢ = - × ￿ ￿ ￿ . Combining this expression with equations (1), (2), 
and (5) and rearranging, the following arbitrage condition is obtained: 
(6)  
Extraction and distribution cost
Marginal User Cost
1
( ) ( ). ( )
( )
i i
t q t d t q t t
t
p c h c p c h l h
r l h
¢ ￿ ￿ = + + + ￿ ￿ ¢ -
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
 
This implies that at the margin, the benefit of extracting water must equal actual physical costs 
(extraction and distribution) plus marginal user cost (decrease in the present value of the water 
stock due to the extraction of an additional unit). Thus if water is priced at physical costs alone, 
as is common in many areas, overuse will occur. Equation (6) also implies that the price in two 
elevation categories will differ only by the difference between their distribution costs. If we 
exclude distribution cost from equation (6), the resulting price is the wholesale price (i.e., the 
price  before  distribution).  We  later  use  this  condition  to  calculate  efficiency  prices  in  all 
elevation categories by first deriving the price path for the lowest elevation category and then 
adding the distribution costs for higher elevation categories. Re-arranging (6), we get an equation 
of price motion: 
(7)   [ ( )] [ ( ) ] ( ) ( )
i i i
t t t q t d t q t p r l h p c h c l h c h ¢ ¢ = - × - - + × ￿  
The first term on the R.H.S. is positive and the second is negative. Their relative magnitudes 
determine whether the price is increasing or decreasing at any time. However, if the net recharge 
is small, the second term is small and may be dominated by the first term, making the price rise. 
The solution to the optimal control problem is governed by the system of differential equations 
(1) and (7). We also need a boundary condition, for which we rewrite equation (4) to get: 
(8) 
i i
t b d p c c £ +  , (if < then  0 t b = )   9 
This implies that desalination will not be used if its cost is higher than the price of freshwater. 
When desalination is used, the price must exactly equal the cost of the desalted water and we can 
substitute 
i i
t b d p c c = +  into (5) to get  ( ) t b q t c c h l = - .  Taking this expression and its time 
derivative and combining these with equations (1) and (2) by eliminating  , , t t l l ￿ and  t h ￿ , yields 
(9) 













Since the derivative of the R.H.S. with respect to ht is negative, the ht that solves equation (9) is 
unique.  We  denote  it  as  * h .  Whenever  desalination  is  being  used,  the  aquifer  head  is 
maintained at this optimal level. At  * h , the quantity extracted from the aquifer equals the net 




q l h = ￿ .    Excess  of  quantity  demanded  is  supplied  by 
desalination. Once the desalination begins, equation (8) implies  0
i i i
t b d t p c c p = + ￿ = ￿ . Thus, the 
system reaches a steady state at the aquifer head level h*.  
We write a computer algorithm
5 to first solve equation (9) to obtain final period head level and 
then use it as a boundary condition to numerically solve equations (1) and (7) simultaneously for 
the time paths of efficiency price and head level. Welfare in each elevation category is computed 
as the area under that category’s demand curve minus extraction and distribution cost (according 
to the objective function (A)). Aggregate welfare is a sum of the welfare in each category.  
For examining the effects of status-quo pricing, we calculate the time path of extraction rates 
dictated by quantity demanded at average cost pricing. When the head level reaches the 
minimum allowable (below which some wells will turn saline), extraction is adjusted such that it 
                                                            
5 For solution algorithms and calculations in this paper, contact the corresponding author.   10 
is equal to the net recharge so that the head level does not fall any further. Any excess demand is 
met from the desalination backstop. Status quo (average cost) price will, therefore, be a volume-
weighted average cost of water from the two sources (desalination and underground aquifer). 
The status-quo scenario serves as a benchmark for comparison with the efficiency pricing 
scenario.   
Block pricing and win-win justice 
Since efficiency price includes marginal user cost as well as extraction and distribution costs (see 
equation (6)), surplus revenue is generated under efficiency pricing. An implicit assumption built 
into the objective function (A) is that any surplus revenue is returned to the consumers. The 
return of revenue can cause problems if it distorts the incentives provided by the efficiency price 
(see e.g., Feinerman and Knapp). We achieve a non-distorting, lump-sum revenue transfer 
through a block-pricing system that allows users a certain amount of water for free (free block). 
The size of the free block is chosen such that the cost of providing that much water is equal to 
the revenue that needs to be returned, i.e., the size of the free block, k
i
t, for a consumer in 
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The quantity of water exceeding the free block is charged the efficiency price
6.  
Even with lump-sum revenue return, however, consumers in early periods may lose relative to 
status quo pricing, especially those in high elevation areas who have to pay for both a higher 
                                                            
6 As long as the actual use exceeds the first block (q>k), the incentives are undistorted. From formula (10), this is 
clearly the case, unless cq(h) and cd are both zero.   11 
wholesale price as well as higher transportation costs. Although gains are generally larger than 
the losses, switch to efficiency pricing may be politically infeasible because losers can oppose 
the change. Also, the change may be considered unjust in the sense of Aristotle’s distributive 
justice (Nicomachean Ethics, V III) and from a benefits taxation viewpoint (see Wicksell, 
Roumasset). One solution to these problems is to compensate the losers.
7 To implement the 
compensation, we modify the block pricing system mentioned above. It not only serves to return 
the revenue but also to effect transfers from winners to losers.  The amount of the compensation 
is added to the revenue returned
8 to the losers (thereby, increasing their free-block size
9). For a 
consumer in category i at time t losing w
i




t q t t t i
t i i
t d
p c h q w
k
p c
￿ ￿ - + ￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿
 
The compensation provided to the losers is financed from the revenues of the winners. We 
compute total losses (of all losers at all times, by switching from status quo to efficiency pricing) 
as a percentage, s, of total gains. The revenues returned to the winners are reduced by the 
percentage losses (s), thereby reducing their free-block size. For a consumer in category i at time 
t gaining any positive amount of welfare, the size of the free block is: 
(11-b) 
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( )
i i
t q t t i
t i i
t q t d
s p c h q
k
p s s c h c
￿ ￿ - × - × ￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ - + × + ￿ ￿
 
                                                            
7 Unlike Kaldor’s compensation principle, which requires that the reform be potentially Pareto-improving, the 
requirement here is that the reform be actually Pareto-improving 
8 In practice, this may require deficit finance to pay for the compensation of the present users and the debt to be 
repaid from the revenues of the future users. 
9 Here, it is possible to have free blocks larger than some users’ actual consumption. Those users will, then, get all of 
their water for free and will not face the efficiency price at the margin. This can be corrected by providing them a 
rebate, equal to the efficiency price, for reducing consumption. We abstract from this case, however, since in our 
Honolulu case presented in the next section, we find that the free blocks for compensation are smaller than actual 
consumption.   12 
Through this intertemporal welfare transfer, the price reform proposal becomes actually Pareto 
improving
10. Next, we discuss the application of this framework to the Honolulu water district. 
Application 
We now apply the above model to the freshwater market supplied from the Honolulu 
groundwater aquifer. We calibrate the above model and solve for efficiency prices, estimate 
welfare effects of switching from efficiency pricing, and compute block prices for the 
compensation of those users who lose welfare due to the switch. 
Calibration 
The volume of water stored in the aquifer depends on the head level, the aquifer boundaries, the 
Ghyben-Herzberg lens geometry, and rock porosity. Although the freshwater lens is a 
paraboloid, the upper and lower surfaces of the aquifers are nearly flat (see Mink).  Thus, volume 
of aquifer storage is modeled as linearly related to the head level. Using GIS aquifer dimensions 
and effective rock porosity of 10%, the Honolulu aquifer has 61 billion gallons of water stored 
per foot of head. This value is used to calculate the conversion factor from head level in feet to 
volume in billion gallons. Extracting one billion gallons (or a thousand MG) of water from the 
aquifer would lower the head by 1/61 or 0.0163934 feet, giving us ￿ = 0.0000163934 ft/MG. We 
econometrically estimate net recharge, l, as a function of the head level, h, to get the recharge 
function: 
2 ( ( )) 157 0.24972 ( ) 0.022023 ( ) l h t h t h t = - - , where l is measured in million gallons per 
day (mgd). 
                                                            
10 The perspicacious reader may notice that exact compensation of losers leaves some better off and some indifferent 
to the change whereas benefit taxation requires that all players are made better off.  The difference here is that we do 
not equate the current benefits of subsidized water with an entitlement of subsidized water for all time.     13 
We calculate the minimum head level, below which wells will begin to turn saline, to be 15 feet. 
The deepest wells into the Honolulu aquifer are at Beretannia pumping station and have a bottom 
depth of about 600 feet. This well system will be the first to go saline as the freshwater head 
level will fall and the saltwater interface will rise to meet the well bottom (thereby, making it 
saline). The current head level at this location is about 22 feet. Using 1:40 ratio of freshwater 
head to depth of saltwater interface in a Ghyben-Herzberg freshwater lens (as calculated by 
Mink), we get current depth of the interface at 880 feet below sea level. When this interface rises 
to the bottom of the Beretannia wells (600 below sea level), the wells will turn saline. Using the 
1:40 ratio, this implies a freshwater head level of 15 feet. 







c h t c
e h
￿ ￿ -
= ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿
, where c0 is the initial extraction cost when the head level h(t) is at the 
current level, h0 = 22 feet (at Beretannia wells). There are many wells from which the freshwater 
is extracted and, using a volume-weighted average cost, we have separately
11 estimated the 
initial average extraction cost in Honolulu at $0.16 per thousand gallon (tg) of water. e is the 
average elevation of these wells and is estimated at 50 feet, and n is an adjustable parameter that 
controls the rate of cost growth as head falls. We initially assume n = 2 (with sensitivity analyses 
for n = 1 and n = 3). Since the head level does not change much relative to the elevation, the 
value of n does not affect the results appreciably. We calculate the distribution cost, cd
i, for each 
elevation category from pumping data (table 1). The unit cost (
b c ) of desalted water has also 
been separately estimated at $7/tg. This includes a cost of desalting ($6.79/tg) and additional cost 
                                                            
11 Appendix showing calculations of the cost and other parameters is available from the corresponding author upon 
request.    14 
of transporting the desalted water from the seaside into the existing freshwater distribution 
network that we assume to be $0.21/tg. 




-µ, where Ai is a constant, g is the 
demand growth rate, pt
i is the price at time t in the elevation category i, and µ is the price 
elasticity of demand. The demand growth rate, g, is assumed to be 1% (based on the projections 
by the City and County of Honolulu).  The constant of the demand function, Ai, in each elevation 
category is chosen to normalize the demand to actual price and quantity data (and is reported in 
table 1). In the status-quo scenario, however, all the users a pay a single price (no elevation 
differentiated pricing) and, therefore, there is a single demand function. The constant of the 
demand function is a single parameter (A=83.77 mgd). Similarly, it is enough to use a single 
parameter (cd = $1.81) for the distribution cost under status quo. Following Krulce, Roumasset, 
and Wilson, we use r = 3% as the discount rate. We set h = – 0.25 (see Moncur) and 
subsequently perform sensitivity analyses with h = – 0.15 and -0.3. Sensitivity analyses are also 
performed with n=1, 2; g=2%, 3%; and r = 1%, 2%, and 4%.  
Results 
We compare two scenarios of water usage/pricing: 1) status-quo pricing (pricing water at 
average extraction and distribution cost), 2) efficiency pricing. Below, we discuss the time-paths 
of prices, head levels, and welfare, under these scenarios. 
Status-Quo Pricing: Price, Quantity, and Head Level 
Status quo price (fig. 1 a), which is set by the Board of Water Supply equal to the cost of 
extraction and distribution averaged over all users, starts at $1.97 per thousand gallons and   15 
increases slightly over time due to the head level (fig. 2 a) draw down through extraction and the 
resulting increase in extraction costs. Consumption (corresponding to the status quo price) in 
each elevation category is given in fig. 3 (a), and at selected intervals, in table 2 (a).  
Higher-elevation users have larger per capita consumption since they are effectively subsidized 
by low-elevation users for distribution costs and also because they generally are high-income 
consumers. Over time consumption increases and the head level decreases until it reaches the 
minimum allowable (to avoid aquifer salinity), in year 57. At this point, extraction must be 
adjusted such that head level does not fall further, i.e., extraction must not exceed recharge. 
Thus, in year 57, consumption is partly supplied from the backstop source (desalination) and 
partly from the groundwater source. The price is therefore a volume-weighted average of the cost 
of the backstop and the cost of the groundwater. This results in a jump in price from $2.05 in 
year 56 to $2.86 in year 57, in fig. 1 (a). As a result, consumption falls in year 57. Afterward, as 
consumption continues to grow, more and more of it is supplied from the backstop source and 




Efficiency Pricing: Price, Quantity and Head Level 
Efficiency price (fig. 1 a) starts at $1.98 per thousand gallons for the first elevation category and 
increases over time, faster than the status quo price, due to the head level (fig. 1 b) draw down   16 
through extraction and the resulting increase in marginal user cost and extraction costs. Table 2 
(b) gives prices for all elevation categories at selected intervals.  
Higher elevations have higher prices due to larger distribution costs. The efficiency price in the 
lowest elevation category starts at $1.98/tg, which is very close to the status quo price of 
$1.97/tg, even though the former includes marginal user cost. This is because, under efficiency 
pricing, low-elevation users pay a lower distribution cost and do not have to subsidize 
distribution costs for higher elevations. Consumption (corresponding to the efficiency price) in 
each elevation category is given in fig.1 (c), and at selected intervals, in table 2 (c). 
Per capita consumption is larger at higher-elevations because of generally higher-income 
consumers living at higher elevations. Over time consumption increases but slower than the 
status quo case because the price rises faster under efficiency. Because of lower efficiency price 
at lower elevations (see equation 6), the same absolute change in price implies a bigger relative 
change for lower elevation consumers than for those at higher elevations. Thus low elevation 
users are more sensitive to price changes. In fact, in the period from year 48 to 68, when the 
price rises steeply, consumption at lower elevations falls slightly, i.e. the price effect offsets the 
effect of exogenous demand growth (g). The head level decreases over time until it reaches the 
minimum allowable to avoid aquifer salinity, in year 76. After this point, extraction must be such 
that head level does not fall further, i.e., extraction must not exceed recharge. Therefore, in year 
76, consumption is partly supplied from the backstop source (desalination) and partly from the 
groundwater source. The efficiency price, thus, reaches the backstop price (plus distribution cost) 
and remains there.    17 
Efficiency Pricing: Revenue, Welfare, Compensation and Block-pricing 
Since the efficiency price includes user costs as well as the actual physical costs (extraction and 
distribution), it results in revenue surplus (as discussed in the previous section) for the water 
utility, which collects the water payments. The present value of revenue per capita is shown in 
fig. 2 (a), and total annual revenue, at selected intervals, is given in table 2 (d). The revenue is 
initially small as the efficiency price is only slightly higher than the status quo price (average 
cost). It is relatively large in the lowest elevation category, however, because of lower 
distribution cost. Over time, the efficiency price rises and the revenue generated increases. 
To return this revenue, as discussed in the previous section, we use block pricing where initial 
block of a certain size is provided to the users free of charge. The size of the free block is 
adjusted as the amount of revenue collected changes over time as shown in fig. 2 (b), and at 
selected intervals, in table 2 (e). The size of the free block is smaller for higher elevation 
categories because their distribution cost is larger and it costs more to provide them the free 
block. The size of the block increases over time as the revenue collected increases and is rebated 
via the free block. 
Switching from the status quo pricing to the above efficiency price system provides welfare 
gains (losses), as shown at selected intervals, in table 2 (f). Per capita welfare gains (losses) by 
switching from status quo to efficiency pricing are shown in fig. 2 (c), and at selected intervals, 
in table 2 (g). Initially (year 0), switching from status quo to efficiency pricing causes a loss of 
welfare due to efficiency prices being higher than the status quo prices. This loss of welfare 
happens in all categories except category 1 where the initial efficiency price ($1.98 / tg) is 
extremely close to the status-quo price ($1.97 / tg) and the resulting miniscule loss of welfare is   18 
more than offset by savings in distribution cost that are passed on to the consumers via the return 
of surplus revenue. Over time, as the efficiency price increases, losses increase for all categories. 
In year 57, under status quo pricing, (expensive) desalination is used, but efficiency pricing 
allows it to be delayed by about two decades (until year 76). Thus efficiency pricing provides 
greater relative welfare after year 57. Even after efficiency pricing results in desalination (year 
76), it remains welfare-superior to the status quo case because the latter has greater consumption 
and, therefore, requires more desalinated water in a particular year. Note that in fig. 2 (c), the 
losses in higher elevation categories seem larger than later gains in all categories. These are per 
capita losses, however, and since there are more users in future and in the lowest-elevation 
category, the gains are actually much larger than the losses. 
Total welfare gains from switching to efficiency pricing are $205 million over the next 100 years 
whereas the total losses are only $34 million (about 16 % of the gains). Since after year 76, 
efficiency pricing remains welfare-superior to the status quo, gains from switching to efficiency 
pricing are even larger if we look at a longer time-horizon. Over the 100 years after the time at 
which continuation of status quo pricing would require the use of the backstop source (i.e., over 
the next 157 years), total welfare gains are $441.25 million, so the initial loss of $34 million is 
only about 7 % of the gains. Sensitivity analyses with different values of the model parameters 
(table 3) show that the gains are substantially larger than the losses under a variety of conditions. 
To make efficiency pricing actually Pareto-improving, we compensate the losers. This is done by 
modifying the block-pricing system used above to return the revenue. We reduce the revenue 
returned to the welfare-gaining users over the next 157 years by 7 % (i.e., the amount of the total 
loss, $34 million) and use the revenue to increase the size of the free block just enough to 
compensate the welfare-losing users. In practice, in any period in which gains are smaller than   19 
losses, compensation would be provided by borrowing in that period and repaying the debt from 
the revenues of the future users. The size of the free block to provide compensation and to return 
the surplus revenue is given in fig. 2 (d), and at selected intervals, in table 2 (f). The size of the 
free block is now initially larger for higher elevation categories, because they are losing larger 
welfare by switching to efficiency pricing and need larger compensation. Over time the free-
block size increases for all categories, until the year 57 when status quo would require the use of 
the backstop and efficiency pricing that avoids the need for backstop is welfare superior. Thus 
the size of the free block falls in year 57 since users do not need to be compensated (in fact, they 
are the welfare-gaining users who compensate the losers by reducing their free block size). After 
this fall, the size of the free block continues to grow as the revenue collected from efficiency 
pricing increases and is returned to the users. 
Conclusion 
We provide a method for determining efficient spatial and inter-temporal water management for 
a system with water demand at several different elevations supplied from a renewable coastal 
aquifer, which is subject to salinity if over-extracted. We calibrate and numerically solve the 
model for the freshwater market in Honolulu to obtain efficiency prices and quantities, and to 
determine the welfare effects of switching from the current system of pricing at average cost to a 
system of efficiency pricing. 
We find that if status quo policy of pricing water at average (extraction and distribution) cost is 
continued, the consumption will grow quickly and the groundwater aquifer will be depleted fast 
(in about 57 years) with the head level reaching the minimum allowable (to avoid salinity). After 
that, extraction of groundwater cannot exceed the recharge rate. Any excess demand at that time   20 
and future growth in demand must be met from the more expensive, desalination technology. 
The average-cost price would therefore be equal to the volume-weighted average cost of water 
from the groundwater and desalination sources. This results in a price jump (from $2 to $2.86 / 
tg in year 57). Thereafter, the price gradually increases toward the estimated backstop price (of 
$7 plus $1.81 in average distribution costs) as more and more water is supplied from 
desalination. The status quo pricing does not differentiate users by distribution costs, and results 
in subsidies from lower elevation users (with lower distribution costs) to higher elevation users. 
Efficiency pricing requires a slight price increase (from $1.97 / tg to $1.98 / tg) in the first year 
for the lowest elevation category where most of the consumption and users are. This price rises 
smoothly over time, but faster than the status quo price, until the aquifer reaches the minimum 
allowable head level and desalination has to be used (in year 76 when the price is $8.74 / tg). 
Efficiency price at each higher elevation category is higher by the amount of its respective 
distribution cost. As the efficiency price includes category-specific distribution cost, it avoids 
distribution-cost subsidies from lower to higher-elevation users. 
Since efficiency pricing includes user cost as well as the costs of extraction and distribution, it 
results in revenue surplus for water utility. As the purpose of efficiency pricing here is to 
facilitate optimal usage and not to raise revenue, we design a system of block pricing to return 
this revenue to the users and keep a balanced budget in each year. A certain volume of water 
(free block) is provided to the users for free. The size of the free block is chosen such that the 
cost of providing that volume of water is equal to the surplus revenue generated by efficiency 
pricing. The quantity of water usage exceeding the free block is charged the efficiency price. As 
long as the actual use exceeds the free block, the incentives are undistorted.   21 
The efficiency-pricing regime is compared to status quo pricing in terms of welfare. Since the 
efficiency prices are higher than the status quo prices, initially users lose welfare by switching 
from status quo to efficiency pricing. This is not true for the users in the lowest elevation 
category who actually gain welfare because they do not have to subsidize the distribution cost of 
the higher elevation users. Since most of the consumption occurs at the lowest elevation, these 
gains are substantial. Over time, however, as the efficiency prices rise, all categories see 
increasing losses relative to status quo pricing (the present value of all losses is estimated at $34 
million). Later, efficiency pricing becomes welfare-superior to status quo pricing and remains 
superior afterwards because the status quo policy would require the use of expensive, 
desalination technology sooner and relies on it more heavily than efficiency pricing. Thus 
efficiency pricing provides greater welfare to users in all elevation categories later on (for the 
100 years after year 57, the present value of the gains is estimated at $441 million). 
Switching to efficiency pricing causes some (mostly high-elevation and near-term) users to lose 
welfare and some (mostly low-elevation and future) users to gain. Although gains are larger than 
losses and Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky potential compensation criteria are met, switch to efficiency 
pricing may be politically infeasible and may also be considered unjust from the perspective of 
Wicksellian benefit taxation and Aristotle’s distributive justice. We avoid these problems by 
actually compensating the losers. This is achieved by compensating welfare-losing users through 
a larger free block. The cost of this addition to the free block is financed by a reduction in the 
size of the free block provided to the welfare-gaining users, who gain welfare in spite of this   22 
reduction. Efficiency pricing is thus made actually Pareto-improving by compensating those who 
lose welfare due to the switch from status quo pricing.
12 
                                                            
12 The higher-elevations users are typically also the high-income users for whom water expenditures make up a tiny 
fraction of their income. Increase in water prices due to efficiency pricing is, therefore, not likely to be something 
that they will actively lobby against. Thus, an alternative version of the proposal would be to compensate present 
losers but not high elevation users. This is akin to Wicksell’s relative unanimity. This modified win-win pricing 
scheme might still be politically feasible to the extent that water expenditures would remain a small portion of the 
budgets of high-income consumers even without compensation.   23 
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Figure 1: Status Quo v. Efficiency Pricing: Prices, Head Levels, and Quantities   26 
 



































































































(d) Free block for compensation and revenue return 
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Constant of the 




($/1,000 gallons)  
Effective Price  
($/1,000 g) 
1  0.00  67.58  1.74  0.23 
2  447.89  13.40  2.09  -0.12 
3  819.47  1.83  2.51  -0.54 
4  1071.08  0.64  3.22  -1.25 
5  1162.57  0.13  4.14  -2.17 
6  1344  0.09  5.28  -3.31 
*Current average retail rate is $1.97 / 1,000 gallons. Subtracting distribution cost, we get the effective price. 
 
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis: Welfare gain / loss under different parameter values 
Parameter Values  Gain ($)  Loss ($)  Loss / Gain (%) 
n=1, g=1, r=3, h=-0.25  4.46321 X 10
8  3.36008 X 10
7  7.52839 
n=2, g=1, r=3, h=-0.25  4.41492 X 10
8  3.41286 X 10
7  7.7303 
n=3, g=1, r=3, h=-0.25  4.37378 X 10
8  3.24464 X 10
7  7.41839 
g=2, r=3, h=-0.25, n=2  2.87016 X 10
9  7.10178 X 10
7  2.47435 
g=3, r=3, h=-0.25, n=2  8.90351 X 10
9  1.03764 X 10
8  1.16543 
r=1, h=-0.25, n=2, g=1  1.29086 X 10
9  5.31298 X 10
7  4.11585 
r=2, h=-0.25, n=2, g=1  4.10026 X 10
9  8.96464 X 10
7  2.18636 
r=4,  h=-0.25, n=2, g=1  1.66164 X 10
8  2.36151 X 10
7  14.2119 
h=-0.15, n=2, g=1, r=3  7.47648 X 10
8  3.89001 X 10
7  5.20299 
h=-0.3, n=2, g=1, r=3  3.47041X 10
8  3.23112 X 10
7  9.31051 
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Table 2: Summary of Results 
Year  Categ. 1  Categ. 2  Categ. 3  Categ. 4  Categ. 5  Categ. 6 
  (a) Consumption under Status Quo (gallons per capita per day) 
0  111  115  120  127  135  143 
56  172  179  186  197  209  222 
57  160  166  173  183  194  206 
100  201  209  218  231  245  260 
  (b) Efficiency Price ($ / thousand gallons) 
0  1.98  2.33  2.75  3.46  4.38  5.52 
76  8.74  9.09  9.51  10.22  11.14  12.28 
100  8.74  9.09  9.51  10.22  11.14  12.28 
  (c) Consumption under Efficiency Price (gallons per capita per day) 
0  111  111  112  112  113  113 
48  141  143  146  148  151  153 
68  138  142  146  151  156  161 
76  140  145  149  155  161  167 
100  171  175  181  188  195  202 
  (d) Present value of revenue (million $ per annum) 
0  1.8  0.35  0.048  0.017  0.003  0.002 
76  207.23  42.06  5.91  2.15  0.46  0.34 
100  263.45  53.46  7.52  2.73  0.59  0.43 
  (e) Size of the free block (gallons per capita per day) for revenue return 
0  4.8  4.1  3.4  2.7  2.2  1.7 
76  108.8  107.9  106.2  102.8  97.9  91.8 
100  113.2  112.8  111.8  109.2  105.1  99.6 
  (f) Present value of welfare gain (loss) by switching from status quo to efficiency pricing    ($ 
per day) 
0  450.775  -358.065  -119.355  -80.665  -26.645  -26.645 
56  -1268.01  -367.92  -69.35  -35.405  -10.22  -9.49 
57  3639.05  642.4  75.19  18.615  2.19  -0.365 
76  3196.67  612.47  80.3  25.915  4.745  2.555 
100  4054.785  804.825  110.23  38.325  8.03  5.11 
  (g) Present value of per capita welfare gain (loss) by switching from status quo to efficiency 
pricing    ($ per capita per day) 
0  0.002  -0.009  -0.02  -0.04  -0.07  -0.102 
56  -0.006  -0.008  -0.012  -0.017  -0.024  -0.03 
57  0.017  0.015  0.013  0.009  0.004  -0.001 
76  0.014  0.014  0.013  0.012  0.010  0.008 
100  0.0177  0.0178  0.0179  0.0178  0.0175  0.0168 
  (h) Size of the free block (g / d / capita) for compensation and revenue return 
0  4.48  8.27  12.09  16.04  18.76  20.34 
56  88.47  87.18  85.41  82.24  78.23  73.66 
57  80.94  77.12  72.8  66.26  59.16  55.85 
76  106.78  105.61  103.75  100  94.81  88.52 
100  110.11  109.57  108.36  105.53  101.17  95.57 
 
  
 
 